We seek to develop a plausible conception of genetic parenthood, taking a recent discussion by Heidi Mertes as our point of departure. Mertes considers two conceptions of genetic parenthood-one invoking genetic resemblance and the other genetic inheritance-and presents counter-examples to both conceptions. We revise Mertes' second conception so as to avoid these and related counter-examples.
| INTRODUC TI ON
Recent scientific developments suggest that it will become increasingly common for children to inherit their genomes from one or more existing human beings, but in ways that differ substantially from standard forms of human reproduction. One such development is the successful application of mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT) in human reproduction. The aim of MRT is to avoid transmission of mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) mutations; a baby is created through in vitro fertilization (IVF) using a man's sperm and a woman's egg, but shortly before or after fertilization, the egg's disease-linked mtDNA is replaced with healthy mtDNA from a donor egg. The first baby resulting from MRT was born in 2016.
Such babies have been referred to as "three-parent babies." 1 Another technique that may enable a significant departure from "normal" human genetic inheritance is the creation of stem cell-derived gametes. In the not too distant future, sperm and eggs derived in the laboratory from pluripotent stem cells may be used to create embryos and eventually children. The pluripotent stem cells needed to generate these gametes could be extracted from embryos left over following fertility treatments, from embryos created through IVF for the specific purpose of gamete-derivation, or from embryos cloned from a person's somatic (body) cells, either via a process known as somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT 2 ) or via the induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cell technique.
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Questions arise as to whether the children created through these techniques would have genetic parents, and, if so, who, precisely, those genetic parents would be. Bioethicists have already begun to address these questions, 4 motivated in part by the thought that, if these children would be "genetic orphans" or would have three or more genetic parents, this could be ethically significant. For example, it has been suggested that creating genetic orphans might be problematic because genetic parenthood is sometimes regarded as a "last ditch" criterion for 2 SCNT involves transferring the nucleus of a somatic cell into an egg cell from which the nucleus and thus most of the DNA has been removed. The manipulated egg cell is then treated with an electric current in order to stimulate cell division, resulting in the formation of an embryo that is almost genetically identical to the somatic cell donor. 3 The induced pluripotent stem cell technique involves the direct reprogramming of somatic cells to an embryonic state through genetic manipulation. See, for example, Takahashi, K., Tanabe, K., Ohnuki, M., Narita, M., Ichisaka, T., Tomoda, K., & Yamanaka, S. However, before turning to these tasks, we must offer three preliminary comments.
The first concerns the relationship of the concept of genetic parenthood to other concepts of parenthood. The concept of genetic parenthood that we seek to capture is, of course, distinct from the concepts of gestational and social parenthood. But we believe that it is also, though less obviously, distinct from the concepts of biological and causal parenthood. Biological and causal parenthood are, we take it, concepts that were without error deployed even before the details of genetic inheritance were understood. 9 By contrast, the concept of genetic parenthood that we seek to capture is, we think, one that has developed in response to the acquisition of such understanding, and that now co-exists with, though has arguably largely replaced in everyday discourse, biological and causal parenthood.
The second preliminary comment concerns the scope of our analysis. We assume throughout that genetic parenthood is a relation that obtains between two humans, and we discuss only cases involving humans. There is plausibly a concept of genetic parenthood that applies to other species; perhaps it applies to all other species that reproduce sexually. But we do not wish to commit ourselves to the view that this is the same concept as the concept that applies to humans.
Finally, the third clarification concerns the aim of our analysis. What does it mean to say that C "has 50% of P's DNA" or that there is a "50% overlap" between C and P's DNA? The thought cannot be that 50% of C's DNA is numerically identical to 50% of P's DNA, for P and C's DNA are in different locations, and have different survival conditions (one could destroy P's DNA without destroying C's). Nor does
Mertes mean that 50% of C's DNA is inherited from P, for, as we shall see, she criticizes this account of genetic parenthood on the basis that it is insensitive to the direction of inheritance. Rather, the thought simply seems to be that 50% of C's DNA resembles 50% of P's DNA. More
precisely the thought appears to be:
Informational Overlap: P is C's genetic parent if and only if 50% of C's genetic material encodes the same information as 50% of P's DNA.
One difficulty with this conception is that it is too inclusive. We take issue with Mertes' second concern. It makes perfectly good sense to say that we "share 50% of our DNA with our children," in the sense specified by Informational overlap, it is just that this is false: we in fact share much more of our DNA with them than that, since we share more than 99% of our DNA even with other humans to whom we are not closely related. Moreover, it seems possible to modify Informational overlap to avoid this problem; we simply need to increase the percentage of informational overlap that is required.
After all, whatever share of our DNA overlaps with that of all other humans, an even higher share overlaps with that of our putative genetic parents. Suppose that 99.9% of our DNA overlaps with that of all other humans, but 99.95% overlaps with that of our putative genetic parents. In that case, we should modify Informational overlap such that "50%" is replaced by "99.95%."
Mertes' first concern, however, would remain. Informational overlap does not distinguish parent-child relations from child-parent relations, some sibling-sibling relations, and instances in which genetic strangers by chance share the same proportion of genetic information as putative genetic parents and their putative genetic children. This is clearly a problem.
Moreover, this problem cannot be resolved by being more precise about which information in an individual's genome must resemble that of the putative genetic parent. In addition, the proposed revision to Informational Overlap does not help to prevent the genetic parenthood relation from running in both directions, such that P is C's genetic parent, and vice versa.
| D IREC T G ENE TIC DE SCENT
How should we solve these problems? One option that Mertes considers involves shifting to a second conception of genetic parenthood according to which "X is a genetic child of Y if X is directly derived from Y's genes." 15 We take it that the "directly" is intended to rule out cases in which the genetic relation is one of genetic grandparenthood or some similarly or more distant genetic descent-that is, relations of genetic descent that are mediated by other individuals. (It would need to be further specified what sort of entities can qualify as "individuals" for the purposes of this directness condition, an issue to which we will return below.)
We take it also that the kind of derivation in question is one in which the putative genetic child's genes derive from the putative genetic parent's genes. Suppose a sperm from P1 is used to fertilize an egg from P2. The resulting zygote then has its DNA removed and replaced by DNA from some other individual T. This zygote is then carried to term and eventually a child, C, is born. There is a sense in which C derives directly from P1 and P2's genes; those genes governed the development of gametes, which created a zygote from which C developed. But C's genes do not derive from P1 and P2's genes, they derive instead from T's genes, and this surely prevents P1 and P2 from qualifying as C's genetic parents.
Taking these two qualifications into account, we could formulate Mertes' second proposed conception of genetic parenthood as follows:
Direct Genetic Descent: P is C's genetic parent if and only if (a) C's genes derived from P's genes, and (b) not through deriving from the genes of some third, intervening individual, M. 
She holds that
Rather than being a black-or-white concept (either one is a genetic parent or one is not), it appears that there is also a grey area in which some people may be more or less of a genetic parent than others. There is no fixed, scientific, everlasting criterion of genetic parenthood that everyone can agree upon. Quite on the contrary, the concept is increasingly challenged by new and hypothetical interventions in reproductive medicine.
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This passage advances a number of claims. Among them, plausibly, are the claims that:
1. Genetic parenthood comes in degrees or at least has vague boundaries.
2.
There is disagreement about the nature of genetic parenthood.
3.
Genetic parenthood is a subjective concept that depends on the views of people about what sorts of genetic relation matter.
Those views may change as a result of scientific developments.
We believe that these claims are all somewhat plausible, but we do not think they follow from the rejection of Informational Overlap and Direct Genetic Descent. In particular, we think it would be premature to conclude from the rejection of these views that genetic parenthood is a subjective concept in the sense specified by 3 (and assuming that we are interested in the concept of genetic parenthood implicit in common usage), for there are other objective conceptions of genetic parenthood available. In the next section, we explore some of these available conceptions and present one of these as a plausible alternative to Informational Overlap and Direct Genetic Descent.
| OUR CON CEP TI ON
One promising route to a more plausible conception of genetic parenthood would involve refining Direct Genetic Descent so as to avoid the putative counter-examples that Mertes and Sparrow discuss.
Here is one possible refinement: in cases where P3 and P1 are in a personal relationship with one another, will be C4's social parents, and pursue mitochondrial donation in part to ensure that their child will have some genetic link to P3. In this case, P2 effectively serves only as a nuclear DNA donor.
Mertes writes that, in this situation, despite the small genetic contribution made by P3 to C4, P3 might 'consider herself' a genetic parent of C4. (Sparrow also thinks that intentions sometimes matter for assigning genetic parenthood. See Sparrow, op. cit. note 11, pp.
314-316.) We agree that P3 might consider herself a genetic parent in this case, but we do not find it plausible that she is a genetic parent on the concept of genetic parenthood implied by common usage. We suspect that intuitions to the effect that P3 is a genetic parent (who is cloned from C1). We propose that the intervening individual (C1) does not break the genetic parenthood relation in this case because she passes on too much of her genetic information to C2. This appears to be the result that Mertes and Sparrow favour. In Cloned Parent, Mertes and Sparrow think it is counterintuitive that C3 (a clone of P1) has no genetic parents; they appear to believe that P1's genetic parents count as C3's genetic parents too. We propose that this is because P1 again passes on too much of her genetic information to C3 and so does not qualify as an intervening individual for the purposes of breaking the genetic parenthood relation. We stipulate, then, that, when C derives genetic information from P via some intervening individual M, this disqualifies P from being C's genetic parent only if C derived some specified proportion of his genetic material from M. This specified proportion will most plausibly, as with "proportion X", be a range of proportions, and it may be a range with fuzzy boundaries. But so long as the range is set so as to exclude cases of cloning-that is, cases where (virtually) 100% of C's genes derive from M's genes-we can maintain the result that, if C is a clone of M, the genetic parenthood relation between P and C is preserved.
This suggested revision yields the following conception of ge- roughly 50% of the child's genes must derive from, not necessarily resemble, the parent's genome. Thus, suppose P1 and P2 want a child, but P2 is infertile. They create a child, C, using P1's sperm and an oocyte from P2's identical twin sister. Though roughly 50% of C's genes will resemble P2's genes, they were not derived from her genes. Then there is the question of moral significance. It is not our intention to explore in detail the moral implications of this conception of genetic parenthood here-our goal in this article has been conceptual, not ethical. However, it is perhaps worth briefly noting that our conception does not appear helpful to those who wish to hold that the genetic parenthood relation is of moral significance. The chief reason for this is that Modified Direct Proportionate Genetic Descent invokes properties that are most naturally understood as threshold (or "range") properties: namely, the property of deriving proportion X (or Y) of one's genes from another individual. These properties are most naturally understood to consist in lying between two (possibly fuzzy) thresholds on some scale of genetic inheritance. Yet, it is difficult to see why these thresholds should mark anything of moral significance. Perhaps it matters morally that we derived some proportion of our genes from another individual. Perhaps it even matters that we derived a greater rather than a lesser proportion from that other individual. But even if the proportion of our genetic inheritance matters in these ways-a point on which we remain neutral-it is difficult to see why it should matter that this proportion lies between two thresholds marking the boundaries of our commonsense conception of genetic parenthood. Those thresholds seem arbitrary from a moral point of view.
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The author declares no conflict of interest. volves material overlap, contributes to the phenotype of the offspring and persists to the future generation." She understands material overlap such that it requires the transfer of physical matter. We reject the view that material overlap is an essential requirement for genetic parenthood. Suppose that, to contribute its genetic information to an egg cell, a sperm cell merely has to touch that egg. The egg is able to detect the genetic information of the sperm via some form of electromagnetic communication, and it then internally creates genetic material encoding that same information. Thus, the sperm passes on its genetic information to the egg, but without any transfer of physical matter. No molecules or particles from the sperm enter the egg. It seems to us that this mode of genetic heritance would be consistent with the presence of a genetic parenthood relation between the individual who produced the sperm and the individual whom the fertilized egg becomes. 24 For a denial of the view that early embryos qualify as human organisms, see Persson, I. (2003) . Two claims about potential human beings. Bioethics, 17(5-6), 503-517. 25 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing us to make this point. 
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